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The authors analyze the determinants of fatalities in 
2,194 large flood events in 108 countries between 1985 
and 2008. Given that socioeconomic factors can affect 
mortality right in the aftermath of a flood, but also 
indirectly by influencing flood frequency and magnitude, 
they distinguish between direct and indirect effects of 
development on flood mortality. The authors find that 
income is negatively associated with the frequency of 
floods and, conditional on their magnitude, the fatalities 
they cause in developing countries. However, for 
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developed countries they find that increased income is 
associated with more fatalities, both directly (conditional 
on flood occurrence and magnitude) and indirectly 
through an increase in the frequency and magnitude 
of flood events. Also in contrast to the literature, they 
find that the effect of governance on flood frequency 
and fatalities in developing countries is U-shaped, with 
improvements in governance reducing the numbers of 
floods and deaths when governance is weaker but raising 
them when governance is stronger.Nature, socioeconomics and adaptation to natural disasters: new evidence from floods  
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Nature, socioeconomics and adaptation to natural disasters: new evidence from floods  
1. Introduction 
Recent studies have analyzed the role of socioeconomic factors in determining fatalities 
from natural disasters (Kahn 2005, Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008, Cavallo and Noy 
2010),
1 earthquakes in particular (Anbarci et al. 2005, Escaleras et al. 2007, Cavallo et al. 
2010, Keefer et al. 2010). An appealing and intuitive general finding from these studies is 
that countries that are richer and have stronger institutions suffer fewer deaths from natural 
disasters, as they are evidently better able to agree on, invest in, and enforce zoning 
regulations, building codes, and other preventive measures. 
In this paper, we analyze new data on 2,194 flood events in 108 countries during 
1985-2008, and our results tell a very different story. Although we find that income is 
negatively associated with the frequency of floods and, conditional on their magnitude, the 
fatalities they cause in developing countries, we find that it increases flood frequency, 
magnitude, and fatalities in developed countries. Also in contrast to the literature, we find 
that the effect of governance is not uniformly salutary. Its effect on flood frequency and 
fatalities in developing countries is U-shaped, with improvements in governance reducing 
the number of floods and deaths when governance is weaker but raising the number when 
governance is stronger. We find no evidence that governance affects flood magnitude in 
developing countries or flood frequency, magnitude, or fatalities in developed countries. 
                                                           
1 Destructive natural events occur regularly across the world, although most do not cause enough damage to 
be considered natural disasters. To be included in the widely used EM-DAT global disaster database, an event 
needs to fulfill at least one of the following criteria: (i) 10 or more people killed, (ii) 100 or more people 
reported affected (typically displaced), (iii) a declaration of a state of emergency, or (iv) a call for 
international assistance (OFDA/CRED 2010). 3 
 
These results are not a trivial exception to past findings. Floods were the most 
common natural disaster between 1985 and 2009, accounting for 40 percent of the total 
number of events, more than half of the number of people affected (including more than a 
tenth of those killed), and the bulk of economic damages (Table 1). Of all natural disasters 
over the last 25 years, their frequency has increased most rapidly (Figure 1). This rapid 
increase has been linked to climate change and is expected to become more pronounced 
over this century (IPCC 2001; Wetherald and Manabe 2002; Emanuel 2005; Swiss Re 
2006; IPCC 2007a; Table SPM2 IPCC 2007b). There is general agreement that the impacts 
of climate change will be larger in poorer countries (Tol 2008), which have greater 
exposure to climate change, particularly in agriculture and water resources, and lower 
adaptive capacity (Adger 2006; Smit and Wandel 2006; Tol and Yohe 2007). Already 
during the last 25 years, over 95 percent of the deaths caused by large floods were recorded 
in developing countries (DFO 2010), which was higher than their shares of flood events 
and population (77 and 84 percent, respectively). 
  Nearly all previous economic studies on disasters have drawn data from the 
Emergency Events Database (Cavallo and Noy 2010), which is affiliated with the World 
Health Organization and several other international organizations (EM-DAT; 
www.emdat.be). Though widely used, EM-DAT has shortcomings that include multiple, 
separate events being recorded as a single one and underreporting of smaller events in 
developing countries (Jonkman 2005, p. 153). Our flood data originate instead from the 
Dartmouth Flood Observatory‘s (DFO) Global Archive of Large Flood Events, which is 
housed at the University of Colorado (floodobservatory.colorado.edu). The DFO is funded 
by NASA and the European Commission. It uses a collection of tools to detect and locate 4 
 
flood events, especially remotely sensed data from NASA, the Japanese Space Agency, and 
the European Space Agency, which provide frequent updates of worldwide surface water 
conditions. It records floods with ―significant damage to structures or agriculture, long 
(decades) reported intervals since the last similar event, and/or fatalities.‖ The DFO 
Archive is used more often than EM-DAT by flood researchers, as it provides more detail 
on flood events, including flood magnitude and GIS data on specific areas affected within a 
given country, and has a reputation for strong quality control.   
In addition to exploiting a new data source, we take steps to identify the effects of 
income and governance more rigorously than previous disaster studies have. Although 
most studies have analyzed panel data, only one has exploited this data structure to include 
country and year effects that control for unobserved heterogeneity in spatial and time 
dimensions (Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008). The exception separately analyzed country-
level data on fatalities caused by earthquakes, landslides, windstorms, and extreme 
temperature in addition to floods, and unlike our study it found that income had an inverted 
U-shaped impact on flood fatalities. It excluded governance indicators, however, so this 
effect might not be an unbiased estimate of the income effect. Several other studies have 
included both income and governance but not country or year effects (Kahn 2005 for the 
same five types of disasters; Anbarci et al. 2005 and Keefer et al. 2010 for earthquakes). 
Kahn applied instrumental variables to a subsample of the countries in his model, but this 
caused all the income and governance variables to become insignificant at 5%, and not just 
because the standard errors rose. Keefer et al. allowed income and governance to have 
nonlinear effects, but not in the same model.  5 
 
Our models include country and year effects and allow income and governance to 
have nonlinear effects in the same model. The usual reason economists are reluctant to 
include country effects in panel models is concern that governance indicators exhibit too 
little within-country variation to permit identification of their effects. The indicators in our 
sample exhibit substantial variation within countries, and this enables us to identify highly 
significant effects of both income and governance, not just one or the other, in several 
models. As mentioned earlier, these effects evidently differ between developing and 
developed countries, which is important given that floods have a disproportionate impact in 
developing countries. These differences are broadly consistent with concerns raised by 
hydrologists about flood management practices in developed countries, especially the 
United States.  
 
2. Models  
Income and governance might affect flood fatalities through a variety of indirect and direct 
pathways (Table 2).  They might affect it indirectly through an impact on the number of 
floods, by facilitating the construction, maintenance, and retrofitting of bridges, dams, 
levees, and other flood-management infrastructures and by facilitating the adoption and 
monitoring of zoning regulations, as land use can affect flooding risks (upper left-hand cell 
in Table 2). For example, regulations that reduce the expansion of impervious surfaces 
could result in less frequent flooding. Income and governance might also influence the 
effectiveness and celerity of flood management actions that affect the magnitude of 
flooding, through dam releases and the use of sandbags (lower left-hand cell).  The DFO 
data enable us to estimate models for both the frequency and magnitude of floods. 6 
 
   Once a flood has taken place (that is, conditional on occurrence and magnitude), 
income and governance might affect the number of casualties by keeping people out of 
harm‘s way (upper right-hand cell). Zoning regulations limiting construction and 
settlement into flood plains can do this preemptively. Likewise, monitoring and 
information systems can facilitate evacuation from high-risk areas before flooding occurs. 
A well-functioning emergency and healthcare system  can reduce the number of casualties 
after the flood has occurred (lower right-hand cell). 
2.1 Flood frequency 
We measure flood frequency by the number of floods (F) in country j in year t.  We model 
it as a function of population exposure, measured by the country‘s population (Pop); two 
socioeconomic indicators of vulnerability, income per capita (Y) and governance (G); the 
natural characteristics of the country (Z); unobserved effects for countries (cj) and years 
(θt); and an error term (ujt): 
  ) , , , , , , ( 1 1 1 jt t j jt jt jt jt jt u c G Y Pop f F  Z               (1) 
All the explanatory variables except the natural characteristics of the country are lagged 
one period to mitigate potential endogeneity bias. 
Natural characteristics of a country that could be correlated with flood frequency 
include total land area, precipitation, latitude, elevation, and proximity to the coast. More 
frequent floods are expected, ceteris paribus, where there is more area to be flooded and 
more rain. Latitude, elevation, and proximity to the coast are also important determinants 
of climate systems. These variables are all time-invariant, so they drop out of models that 
include country effects, which capture their effects and the effects of other fixed country 7 
 
characteristics. The year effects control for time-varying factors that affect all countries, 
such as changes in reporting in the DFO archive.
2 
  We also include in Z two proxies for land-use patterns: the percentage of urban 
population and total forest area. Increased urbanization and the related increase in 
impervious surfaces are believed to exacerbate flooding. Despite widespread belief that 
forests can prevent and reduce floods, the effect of forests on the probability and magnitude 
of flood events remains controversial (FAO and CIFOR 2005). Bradshaw et al. (2007) used 
global flood data to show that forests are associated with lower flood risk and severity. 
Using the same data, Van Dijk et al. (2009) offered an alternative explanation: floods are 
correlated with population exposure, which Bradshaw et al. omitted. We therefore control 
for both forest area and population. 
Equation (1) is our benchmark specification, but we consider variants with 
additional controls. We add domestic credit to the private sector to capture access to private 
investments in self-protection against flooding. We include a Gini coefficient to capture the 
degree of inequality in the distribution of income within a country, which Kahn (2005) and 
Anbarci et al. (2005) found to be an important factor explaining earthquake fatalities. Gini 
values range from zero to one, with values closer to one indicating greater inequality. 
Finally, as in Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008), we allow for potential nonlinear effects of 
income through a quadratic specification.  We also allow for nonlinear effects of 
governance, which resource economics studies outside the realm of natural disasters have 
found to be significant (e.g., Ferreira and Vincent 2010). 
                                                           
2 An alternative approach for addressing potential changes in data quality is to limit the sample to only recent 
years, which Wheeler (2010) does in a study based on EM-DAT data. This is a less desirable approach in our 
analysis, given that we rely on within-country variation to identify the effects of income and governance in 
our fixed-effects models.  8 
 
2.2 Flood fatalities 
Unlike equation (1) and most previous papers on natural-disaster fatalities, the unit of 
analysis in our model of the number of people killed (D) is not country-year but rather an 
individual disaster,
3 in our case a particular flood event i in a given country and year. The 
benchmark specification parallels equation (1), with vijt now used to denote the error term:
  ) , , , , , , ( 1 1 1 ijt t j jt jt jt ijt ijt v c G Y Pop g D  Z               (2) 
One difference is that Popijt is now event-specific. As described later, we generated this 
variable by overlaying the area of a country affected by a particular flood event with a 
global population map. Income per capita and the governance indicators are only available 
at the country-year level, so they are matched more coarsely to the corresponding flood 
events.  For the same reason as in equation (1), we lag all the explanatory variables except 
a country‘s natural characteristics.  
In addition to event-specific deaths, the DFO provides a measure of the physical 
magnitude of each flood event (M). This variable enables us to decompose equation (2) 
into two components.  The first is a model of the effects of income and governance on 
deaths, conditional on flood magnitude: 
  ) , , , , , , ( 1 1 1 ijt t j jt jt ijt ijt ijt w c G Y Pop M h D                 (3) 
wijt is the error term. This equation isolates the direct effects of the variables, as shown in 
the right-hand side of Table 2.
4  The second is a model of effects on flood magnitude: 
                                                           
3 Kahn (2005) analyzed death and destruction caused by individual earthquakes but not other individual 
disasters. 
4 We cannot distinguish between the preemptive and reactive channels highlighted in Table 2, as we do not 
have data on the quality of the emergency services, early warning systems, or specific zoning and building 
regulations. 9 
 
  ) , , , , , , ( 1 1 1 ijt t j jt jt jt ijt ijt z c G Y Pop l M  Z               (4) 
zijt is the error term. Like equation (1), this focuses on the variables‘ indirect effects, but on 
magnitude instead of frequency. 
As with equation (1), we consider variants of equations (2)-(4) that include private 




We compiled an unbalanced panel with observations on the number of people killed in 
flood events, as well as variables capturing the physical magnitude of floods and the 
affected population‘s exposure and vulnerability, for 2,194 floods in 108 countries during 
1985-2008.  
3.1 Flood data 
We coded the dependent variable in equation (1), Fjt , as zero if the DFO reported no floods 
in a country in a given year.  Otherwise, we set it equal to the sum of reported events for 
that year. On average, there was just over one flood per country-year in the sample (Table 
3), but the number varied considerably, as the standard deviation was more than twice the 
mean.  More than half (57%) of the observations equaled zero. 
Flood deaths recorded in disaster databases, including the DFO‘s, are typically from 
drowning and severe injuries. Deaths from unsafe or unhealthy conditions following a 
flood are also a health consequence, but disaster statistics typically include only the deaths 
                                                           
5 Some previous studies on disaster fatalities have also included a variable representing the frequency of 
disasters, typically calculated as the sum of previous events. Keefer et al. (2010) found that earthquake 
frequency reduces fatalities, and they argued that more frequent earthquakes increase the payoffs to fatality 
prevention measures. This may be so, but the results presented in this paper refer to models that exclude such 
a variable because the country fixed effects in those models should capture cross-country differences in flood 
frequency. As a test of this, we added the cumulative number of floods to the fatality models, and we found 
that it was insignificant and had little impact on other coefficient estimates.  10 
 
recorded while the event is ―active‖ (Combs et al. 1998; Jonkman and Kelman 2005). Most 
events in our sample killed at least one person, as the proportion of events with zero deaths 
was just 9.9 percent.  Table 3 shows that the mean number killed was large, 119, with great 
variation: the standard deviation was more than 20 times as large. The frequency 
distribution of this variable shows that the large mean and standard deviation are due to a 
long right tail, as more than 90 percent of the values are under 100. One particular event, 
flooding from a 1991 Bangladesh cyclone that had a death toll of 138,000, has an 
especially large impact on the mean and standard deviation. As a robustness check, we 
estimate models that exclude events with unusually large death tolls. 
As water bodies are not confined to national boundaries, some floods in the archive 
(less than 10 percent) are regional in scope. For these events, the reported number of deaths 
is the aggregate figure per event, with no available split between the countries affected. 
Because of this restriction, our sample excludes multi-country floods from all models.   
The DFO reports the magnitude of a flood as the log of the product of three terms: 
area affected by the flood (in km
2) × flood duration (in days) × flood severity. Floods are 
divided into three severity classes depending on their estimated recurrence interval. Class 1 
floods have a 10-20 year-long reported interval between similar events, class 1.5 have a 20-
100 year recurrence interval, and class 2 have a recurrence interval greater than 100 years.  
Flood magnitude varies much less than either the number of floods or the number of 
deaths, with the standard deviation being smaller than the mean. 
3.2 Exposure: Population in flooded areas  
Each entry in the DFO‘s register of major flood events has an associated GIS polygon 
representing the area affected by that event. The DFO uses news and governmental sources 11 
 
to determine this geographic area.  Using GIS, we overlaid flood maps with population 
maps from the Gridded Population of the World v3 (CIESIN-CIAT 2005) to obtain 
estimates of the population exposed to each event.  Population grid maps are available in 5-
year intervals since 1990. We calibrated an exponential curve for the remaining years to 
complete the panel. We used the resulting variable in the flood fatality and magnitude 
models (equations (2)-(4)) instead of national population, which was used in the flood 
frequency model (equation (1)) as observations in the latter model were defined as country-
years. 
The resulting estimates of population exposure to a flood are more accurate than 
statistics based on country-level population statistics, which previous studies on natural 
disasters have used.  In our sample, mean population density in areas affected by floods is 
394.46 persons/km
2, while mean population density at the country level is 154.53 
persons/km
2. This difference reflects the fact that people have tended to concentrate in 
flood plains for millenia. Increased populations in flood plains is one explanation for the 
observed growth in number of floods (Figure 1; Freeman et al. 2003; IPCC 2007a, Chapter 
3). 
3.3 Vulnerability: Socioeconomic and governance indicators 
The indicator of income is GDP per capita converted to constant 2005 international dollars 
using purchasing power parity rates. It comes from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI 2010). Although GNI per capita more accurately measures the income of a country‘s 
population, it was available for slightly few countries and years than GDP per capita. The 
choice between GDP per capita and GNI per capita is inconsequential in our models: we 
estimated all the models using both measures, and results were virtually indistinguishable. 12 
 
Additional socioeconomic controls included in model variants were drawn from the same 
source, including domestic credit to the private sector, expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Data on the Gini coefficient were drawn from a more complete World Bank source 
(Milanovic, 2005).  
  The governance indicators come from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
of Political Risk Services (PRS 2010).  The ICRG is a popular source of governance 
indicators used in cross-country studies. It includes indicators for corruption, bureaucratic 
quality, law and order, democratic accountability, government stability, ethnic tensions, 
and religious tensions. It offers broad country coverage, which reduces the risk of selection 
bias (Kaufmann et al. 1999; Johnston 2001), and is available for a relatively long time 
period (1984 to the present), which conveniently covers the entire period that the DFO data 
are available, unlike governance indicators from all other sources. Indicators in the ICRG 
database take values between 0 and 6 (except bureaucratic quality and government 
stability, which have maximum values of 4 and 12, respectively), with higher values 
denoting better governance. We converted each to a 0-10 scale. A detailed description of 
the indicators along with their correlation coefficients is given in Appendix Table A1. 
The benchmark regression specification included an aggregate governance index 
formed by averaging all seven indicators. Many studies have averaged or, equivalently, 
summed governance indicators, with the rationale being that averaging reduces 
measurement error if the indicators pertain to similar underlying concepts of governance 
and have independent errors (Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995, 1997; Ferreira and 
Vincent 2010). We also included the indicators individually, with particular attention paid 
to three of them: corruption, democratic accountability, and ethnic tensions. Escaleras et al 13 
 
(2007) and Keefer et al. (2010) find that earthquake fatalities increase with corruption, 
while Anbarci et al. (2005) and Kahn (2005) find that fatalities are associated with ethnic 
fragmentation.  Wheeler (2010) uses a variable capturing democratic accountability and 
citizens‘ political freedoms as a measure of transparency in disaster reporting.  
Table 4 shows that the coefficient of variation for the income variable used in our 
models was larger within countries than between countries.  Although it was smaller within 
countries than between countries for the governance variable, it remained relatively large in 
samples that included all the countries or just developing countries.  The country effects 
apparently risk eliminating too much of the variation needed to identify the effects of the 
income and governance variables only for governance in developed countries. 
3.4 Other controls 
A country‘s total land area (km
2), urban population percentage, and mean annual national 
precipitation come from WDI (2010). Latitude (in absolute value), mean elevation (meters 
above sea level), and proximity to coast (measured by the percentage of land area within 
100 km of ice-free coast) come from Gallup et al. (1999). Data on total forest area (km
2), 
encompassing both natural forests and plantations, are available for 1990, 2000, and 2005 
from FAO (2001, 2005, 2007).  We interpolated estimates for other years by calibrating an 
exponential curve to the three observations for each country and expressed forest area as a 
percentage of total land area. Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in 
Table 3. Aside from urban population percentage and forest percentage, all are time-
invariant and appear in the models only if we exclude the country effects. 
  The WDI provides data on mean national precipitation for just 2008. Due to this 
limitation, our FE regressions do not include precipitation, but we doubt this omission 14 
 
biases the results. Appendix Table A2 shows that time-invariant physical features of 
countries explain 73 percent of the variation in the 2008 precipitation data, which implies 
that country effects should do a good job of controlling for differences in mean 
precipitation between countries. 
 
4. Econometric methods 
The number of floods in a country-year in equation (1) and the number of deaths during a 
flood event in equations (2)-(3) are non-negative count variables. Our preferred estimator is 
a quasi-maximum likelihood fixed effects Poisson model with robust standard errors 
(Wooldridge 2002, pp. 674-6), with the year effects included as dummy variables. Aside 
from requiring the fixed effects to have a multiplicative effect on the conditional mean, this 
model places no restrictions on the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. It 
provides consistent estimates of model parameters and their standard errors even if the 
distribution is overdispersed (the variance exceeds the mean; in a Poisson distribution, they 
are equal),
6 includes a large number of zeros, or exhibits serial correlation. These are 
substantial advantages compared to the negative binomial regression model used in 
previous disaster studies (Anbarci et al. 2005, Kahn 2005, Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008, 
Keefer et al. 2010), which generalizes the Poisson by assuming that overdispersion is 
caused by an unobserved effect that follows a Gamma distribution. Moreover, the 
unconditional version of the fixed effects negative binomial model does not provide 
consistent estimates when the number of panels is much above 20 (we have 92-108 
countries, depending on the specification), while the conditional version does not control 
                                                           
6 We formally tested for overdispersion using the tests in Hilbe (2007, p.47) and Cameron and Trivedi (2009, 
p.575). Neither rejected the null that there is no significant overdispersion (p = 0.29 and 0.71, respectively). 15 
 
for individual fixed effects unless a very specific set of assumptions are met (Hilbe 2007, 
pp. 205-7, Guimarães 2008). 
A random effects Poisson model is also available, but Hausman tests rejected it in 
favor of the fixed effects model (p < 0.001). A fixed effects model is also preferred 
conceptually (Wooldridge 2002, pp. 250-1): our sample is not a random draw of countries 
or flood events, and the magnitude of the number of countries in it is not much larger than 
the magnitude of the time dimension (24 years). In any event, the parameter estimates in 
the random effects model turn out to be similar to those in the fixed effects model, which is 
not surprising. The random effects estimator weights within variation relatively more 
heavily than between variation as the time dimension lengthens, and our sample period is 
relatively long compared to typical microeconometric applications of random effects 
models. 
The use of Poisson and other limited-dependent variable models has been 
challenged, as their marginal effects often differ little from the marginal effects of linear 
models applied to the same data, despite the fact that a nonlinear model might fit the 
conditional expectation function better (Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 107). Nonlinearity is 
clearly present in our data. Box-Cox transforms for equations (1)-(3) yield values of the 
theta parameter closer to zero than to one, which indicates that the conditional expectation 
function is better described by a log-linear model, which is the conditional expectation 
function for a Poisson model, than a linear model.
7 Plots of  observed values and residuals 
versus predicted values also indicated nonlinearity. To better understand the consequences 
of modeling nonlinearity directly through the fixed effects Poisson model, we also 
                                                           
7 Given that the dependent variables in equations (1)-(3) include zeros, we added 1 to the dependent variables 
before running the Box-Cox transforms, and we included both the country and year effects as dummy 
variables. 16 
 
estimated equations (1)-(3) using a linear fixed effects model.  And to investigate the 
importance of accounting for unobserved country effects,we also estimated the equations 
using a regular Poisson model, although this model is strongly rejected in favor of the fixed 
effects model (p < 0.001). 
Flood magnitude is a continuous variable, and so linear regression analysis 
techniques are fully appropriate for estimating equation (4). We estimated it using pooled 
as well as fixed-effects models,
8 with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
Hence, three estimators were used for models (1)-(3)—linear fixed effects, regular Poisson, 
and fixed effects Poisson—while just pooled OLS and linear fixed effects were used for 
model (4). 
Two specification issues applied to all four equations.  The first was whether to 
express GDP per capita in logarithmic form, which is a common transformation in the 
literature.  We estimated the models with this transformation and without it, and we found 
that results were not very sensitive to it. We therefore adhered to the convention and used 
the log of GDP per capita. 
The second issue was testing for nonlinear effects of income and governance. We 
estimated four versions of each equation/estimator combination: linear income with linear 
governance, linear income with quadratic governance, quadratic income with linear 
governance, and quadratic income with quadratic governance.  We selected the quadratic 
specification as the preferred specification when the linear and squared terms were both 
individually significant at 10% or better. 
                                                           
8 A significant likelihood-ratio test statistic (P-value=0.00) leads us to reject the pooled model, while a 
Hausman test (P-value=0.00) favored a fixed-effects over a random-effects model.  17 
 
  There could be a problem of sample selection with equations (2)-(3), because data 
on the number of deaths are only available for countries that experienced flooding 
episodes. This is sometimes called incidental truncation.  We applied the test developed by 
Wooldridge (2002, p.667) for Poisson regression models and did not reject the null that 
there is no truncation bias.
9 This does not imply that there is no correlation between 
selection in a given period and the country effects or the explanatory variables, but it does 
rule out correlation between selection and the idiosyncratic errors. 
 
5. Results 
Tables 5-8 present estimation results for equations (1)-(4), respectively. All models shown 
exclude domestic credit, which was consistently insignificant and had a negligible effect on 
other coefficient estimates when it was included (results are available upon request). 
5.1 Effects of income and governance 
Choice of estimator has a large impact on the results.  The first three columns of Tables 5-7 
compare results across the linear FE, regular Poisson, and FE Poisson models for flood 
frequency (Table 5) and fatalities (Tables 6-7).  We estimated four versions of each model 
according to the possible combinations of linear and quadratic income and governance but 
the tables present only the preferred specifications. The preferred specification is linear in 
income and quadratic in governance for both frequency and fatalities when the estimator is 
the FE Poisson model.  The preferred specifications for fatalities are similar for the regular 
Poisson model, which implies that the time-invariant controls included in it (total area, 
                                                           
9 This is a two-step method similar to Heckman‘s (1976) method for linear models. As in equation (1), in the 
selection equation,  the probability of a flood is modeled as a function of socioeconomic and institutional 
variables (Pop, Y, G) and  the natural characteristics of the country, Z (latitude, elevation, precipitation, 
coastal land, forested area, urban population). The test statistic 0.654 is smaller than 2.71, the 10 percent χ 
2critical value with df = 1. 18 
 
elevation, latitude, coastal percentage, precipitation) capture the most important fixed 
differences between countries.  In the flood frequency model, the preferred specification 
for the regular Poisson model includes both quadratic income and governance. Adding 
country effects to the Poisson model causes a loss of significance in the population, urban 
population percentage, and forest percentage variables.  In contrast, a quadratic effect of 
governance does not appear in any of the preferred specifications for the linear FE models.  
We have more confidence in results from the FE Poisson model than results from the other 
two, as it is the only model that accounts for both unobserved heterogeneity across 
countries and the count-data nature of the dependent variables in the frequency and fatality 
models. 
   The first two columns of Table 8 similarly compare results for the pooled OLS and 
linear FE models for flood magnitude, which is a continuous variable.  The preferred 
specifications again differ, with a quadratic effect of income detected in the linear FE 
model but not the pooled OLS model.  We have more confidence in the results from the 
linear FE model, as it accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. 
  Focusing then on the third column in Tables 5-7 and the second column in Table 8, 
the effect of income is negative and significant on frequency, fatalities conditional on 
magnitude, and magnitude up to a turning point of $4,120, which is at about the 50
th 
percentile of the sample and corresponds to countries at the lower end of the upper middle 
income group according to the World Bank‘s classification.  These results imply that 
economic growth in low and lower middle income countries tends to reduce the frequency 
of floods, their magnitude, and, conditional on magnitude, the number of fatalities they 
cause.  For countries in higher income groups (upper middle income, high income), 19 
 
economic growth provides two of the three benefits—reduced frequency and, conditional 
on magnitude, fatalities—but not reduced magnitude.  In those countries, economic growth 
results in floods occurring less frequently but being larger when they do occur.  The 
insignificant effect of income on fatalities in equation (2), which does not control for 
magnitude (Table 6, column 3), reflects these results: the negative effect of income on 
fatalities conditional on magnitude is offset by income‘s nonlinear effect on magnitude, 
which has a positive effect on fatalities (Table 7, column 3).  So, at higher income levels, 
economic growth is associated with increased flood magnitude, which in turn is associated 
with increased fatalities. 
  Governance significantly affects flood frequency and fatalities but not magnitude.  
In the case of fatalities, it is significant both without and with the control for magnitude.  
Like the effect of income on magnitude, it has a U-shaped effect on frequency and 
fatalities, with turning points toward the interior of the distribution in the estimation 
sample.  Improvements in governance thus tend to reduce the number of floods and 
fatalities in countries with weaker governance but to raise them in countries with stronger 
governance. 
  Splitting the sample between developing and developed countries reveals that the 
effect of governance on frequency and fatalities is due entirely to its effects in developing 
countries (columns 4-5 in Tables 5-7).  For the developing country sample, the preferred 
specification for governance in the frequency and fatality models is the same as for the 
overall sample, i.e. quadratic (with some loss of significance for frequency), while 
governance does not have a significant effect, not even linearly, in any of the models for 
the developed country sample.  This difference could be due to the within-country variation 20 
 
in the governance variable being greater in the former sample than the latter (Table 4); if 
so, we failed to identify an effect of governance on flood frequency and fatalities in 
developed countries purely for a statistical reason, not because no effect exists. 
  In contrast, the U-shaped effect of income on flood magnitude is due entirely to the 
influence of developed countries in the overall sample, as this effect is observed only in the 
developed country sample.  A U-shaped income effect is also observed for both fatality 
models in the developed country sample.  The turning points in all three cases are at the 
lower end of the distribution of income values in the sample, however, which indicates 
that, instead of being U-shaped, income actually has an increasingly positive impact on 
magnitude and fatalities in developed countries.  It also has a significant positive effect, 
albeit a linear one, on flood frequency.  So, economic growth tends to worsen all three 
aspects of flooding in developed countries.  A beneficial effect of economic growth on 
flooding occurred only in developing countries, where it significantly reduced flood 
frequency and, conditional on flood magnitude, reduced fatalities in a marginally 
significant way. 
  Reverting to the all-country sample, the effects of income and governance on 
fatalities and magnitude are heavily influenced by high-fatality flood events, defined as 
ones in the 95
th percentile (column 6 in Tables 6-7, column 5 in Table 8).  Excluding those 
events causes governance to become insignificant in both fatality models (it was already 
insignificant in the magnitude model) and income to retain marginal significance only in 
the fatality model that controls for magnitude, with the effect being negative for most 
countries (the relationship is an inverted U, but the turning point is low).  Income and 21 
 
governance evidently matter only for floods that pose the greatest risk to affected 
populations. 
  Appendix table A3, for flood frequency and magnitude, and table A4, for flood 
fatalities, show the results of the preferred specifications for corruption, ethnic tensions and 
democratic accountability, the individual indicators of governance previously analyzed in 
the literature. While the effects of corruption and ethnic tensions on fatalities and 
magnitude are similar to the effects of overall governance, democratic accountability is 
mostly insignificant.  
5.2 Effects of other variables 
  Aside from income and governance, population of the affected area, urban 
population percentage, and forest area percentage are the only time-varying explanatory 
variables in the models discussed so far.  Forest area percentage does not have a significant 
effect in any of the FE models.  In the all-country sample (column 3 in Tables 5-7, column 
2 in Table 8), the only significant effect of population or urban population percentage is a 
negative one on flood magnitude.  These variables thus reduce the number of fatalities 
indirectly.  A negative effect of population on magnitude also occurs in the developing 
country sample and is the only significant effect of population in that sample.  In contrast, 
for developed countries a marginally significant, negative effect on magnitude occurs 
alongside positive effects on frequency and fatalities, especially fatalities conditional on 
magnitude.  The effects of urban population percentage also differ between the two 
samples, being significant and positive for flood frequency, and significant and negative for 
magnitude, in the developing country sample but oppositely signed in the developed 
country sample. 22 
 
  The negative effects of population and urban population percentage on flood 
magnitude in the all-country sample persist when high-fatality floods are excluded (column 
5 in Table 8).  In addition, population now has a significant, positive effect in both fatality 
models, similar to its effect in the developed country sample. 
   The final columns of Tables 5-8 show results for models that include the Gini 
coefficient.  Including this variable cuts the sample by more than half.  Even without 
including the Gini (results not shown, but available upon request), models restricted to this 
sample show much less evidence of a significant effect of income or governance than 
corresponding models estimated using data from all countries or just developing or 
developed countries.  So, the lack of significance of income and governance in the models 
in the final columns is due to a sample-selection effect, not the addition of the Gini.  The 
notable result in these models is that the Gini has a positive and significant effect on 
fatalities (both without and with the control for magnitude) and magnitude.  Increased 
inequality thus tends to increase fatalities both directly and indirectly. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Some of our results are consistent with ones previously reported. The robust, positive 
impact of flood magnitude on the number of deaths echoes findings from studies on 
earthquakes (Kahn 2005, Anbarci et al. 2005, Keefer et al. 2010), as does the positive 
impact of inequality on fatalities (Anbarci et al. 2005). Previous studies report that larger 
national or regional populations are positively associated with fatalities from various types 
of natural disasters (Kahn 2005, Anbarci et a. 2005, Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008, Keefer 
et al. 2010),  similar to our finding that, at least in developed countries, larger populations 23 
 
in affected areas are associated with increased flood fatalities, while an increased urban 
population share does not affect flood fatalities (Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008). The lack 
of a significant effect of forests is consistent with Van Dijk et al.‘s (2009) argument that 
Bradshaw et al.‘s (2007) finding of a significant effect was due to inadequate control for 
potentially confounding factors.  
Our results for income and governance are strikingly different from previous 
papers, however. Most previous studies find income to decrease disaster mortality (Kahn 
2005, Anbarci et al. 2005, Keefer et al. 2010), with Kahn (2005) finding it to decrease 
flood occurrence too. We find these beneficial effects of income only for developing 
countries, which contradicts Kellenberg and Mobarak‘s (2008) finding of an inverted-U 
relationship between income and flood mortality. Our results are the opposite for 
developed countries: increased income is associated with more fatalities, both directly 
(conditional on flood occurrence and magnitude) and indirectly through an increase in the 
frequency and magnitude of flood events.  
There are several reasons why one might expect increased income to reduce disaster 
mortality. It can support development of better forecasting and warning systems, as 
investment in computer modelling of storms and early warning systems can facilitate mass 
evacuations and save lives (Sheets & Williams 2001). It can also facilitate the provision of 
better medical care, emergency treatment, and crisis management (Athey and Stern, 2002). 
In the case of floods, however, some other investments that larger incomes enable—
specifically, infrastructural solutions to flood control—might be less benign.  While some 
infrastructural solutions, in particular dams, can reduce the frequency and magnitude of 
flood events, channelization and levee construction can increase flood stages. There is little 24 
 
disagreement among hydrologists that levees increase flood levels. Floodplain 
encroachment and managed flood-control systems alter natural flooding patterns, which 
can increase the number of floods (Pinter 2005). For example, levee construction and 
channelization have deepened and narrowed the major rivers of North America. Narrower 
channels exhibit more variable and higher discharges than broader, unimpounded rivers. 
River engineering might thus magnify flood stages and shorten the average recurrence 
interval for major floods (Criss and Shock 2001). In the United States, this process has 
continued even after disastrous floods have occurred, such as the great Midwestern flood of 
1993 (Pinter 2005). The positive effect of income on flood frequency and magnitude in 
developed countries perhaps reflects this river engineering approach, while the negative 
effect of income on flood frequency in developing countries reflects an approach that, so 
far anyway, has relied more on dams. 
Despite resulting in more frequent and larger floods, river engineering may result in 
a ―safe development paradox‖ (Burby 2006), with people believing that levees and other 
flood-control infrastructure will protect them and thus exposing themselves to higher risks 
and failing to take private actions to protect themselves. The large number of fatalities in 
New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina has been held up as a recent example of this (Burby 
2006). This paradox could explain the positive effect of income on flood fatalities in 
developed countries, even controlling for flood occurrence and magnitude. In contrast, the 
negative income effect in developing countries could be due to increased investment in 
early warning systems, evacuation programs, and emergency medical care. Our results 
imply that there is still a gap between developing and developed countries in this regard, 
however: although flood magnitude has a positive impact on the number of deaths in both 25 
 
groups of countries, the size of its impact is slightly larger in developing countries, which 
is consistent with those countries having fewer resources to cope with larger floods. 
The safe development paradox also offers a possible explanation for our finding 
that larger population exposure results in a larger number of deaths in developed countries 
but not in developing countries. Facing a flood, people in developed countries may be more 
likely to think they will be protected by levees, while people in developing countries may 
be more likely to evacuate. Population in the affected area has a very robust negative 
impact on flood magnitude across all samples, including both developing and developing 
countries, which suggests that the safe development paradox is not simply a matter of the 
number of people located in flood zones but also their behavior and the behavior of 
governments toward them. More people means more hands to fight a flood, and it also 
means a higher payoff to actions that mitigate flooding in heavily populated areas. 
Differences between developing and developed countries also appear for the other 
population variable in our models, the urban population percentage. Increased urbanization 
is associated with more frequent, smaller floods in developing countries but less frequent, 
larger ones in developed countries. The urbanization variable is measured at the national 
level, not the area affected by a flood, and it potentially reflects the effects of both physical 
and social factors: increased urbanization increases runoff because urban surfaces are more 
impervious than undeveloped land, but it also increase incentives for governments to 
prevent floods in urban areas. Differences in its effects between the two groups of countries 
may be due to differences in the relative importance of these two factors. The result for 
developed countries is consistent with governments choosing to manage floods so as to 
spare cities, for example by flood diversion and inundation of large rural areas. This would 26 
 
be reflected in the DFO‘s flood magnitude measure, which includes the area affected as 
one of its three components. 
Regarding governance, our results indicate that it helps explain flood mortality only 
in developing countries. In addition, they indicate that its effect is more complicated than 
suggested in previous papers, which have examined only a linear effect, with higher levels 
of democratic accountability and lower levels of corruption being associated with reduced 
disaster mortality (Kahn 2005, Keefer et al. 2010). We find that improvements in our 
governance index reduce flood frequency and flood mortality in developing countries only 
up to a point, which roughly corresponds to the mean/median. Beyond that threshold, 
further improvements in governance are associated with increases in both flood frequency 
and flood mortality. We find no effects of improvements in governance in developed 
countries, although that might be due to our governance index varying less within those 
countries than developing countries. 
One possible explanation for the reversal of the effect of governance in developing 
countries is a combination of what has been called the ―local government paradox‖ (Burby 
2006) in the flood control and government disaster policy literature, and the emphasis on 
decentralization by institutional strengthening programs promoted by international 
development organizations. The local government paradox is the proposition that local 
governments take natural hazards less seriously than central governments do. Although 
elected officials at the national level may face distorted incentives to invest in disaster 
preparedness—Healy and Malhotra (2009) show that voters reward incumbents for 
delivering disaster relief but not for investing in disaster prevention—Burby (2006) argues 
that this distortion is more marked at the local level. In the U.S., there are examples of local 27 
 
officials resisting proposals to reduce storm risks because they did not want to pay their 
share of federal projects.  Local governments care more about ―tangible‖ benefits like 
creating employment, constructing new schools, etc. than protecting the population against 
risks that may not materialize.  
Decentralization programs might have inadvertently made the local government 
paradox more prominent in developing countries. Decentralization has been at the center 
stage of institutional reform over the last thirty years in a large number of developing and 
transition economies. Independently of the direction of causality between decentralization 
and governance, our results are compatible with a process of institutional improvement 
associated with devolution of power from the central to local governments and the local 
government paradox. Beyond the turning point in the U-shaped governance relationship, 
this effect would dominate, and thereby increase flood frequency and mortality, over other 
positive impacts associated with improved governance. Anecdotal evidence from the 
aftermath of Hurricane Mitch supports this hypothesis:  
Hurricane Mitch has highlighted the abilities and limitations of municipalities and other local actors in 
Central America to act in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and in the period of reconstruction. Local 
actors have mobilized a remarkable effort following Mitch; however they were often forced to respond in 
an ad-hoc fashion due to the inadequacy of both disaster preparation and internal capacities, and the lack 
of financial resources. As a result, the Hurricane has also re-energized the debate on decentralization as a 




In principle, we could test the potentially opposing effects of governance and 
decentralization by adding a variable that measures degree of decentralization to our 
models. Unfortunately, decentralization indicators for our sample are not readily available. 
We do not believe that our results are driven by improved reporting of the number 
of floods and fatalities associated with larger incomes or better governance. If that were the 28 
 
case, we would expect income to have a positive (not a negative) impact on flood 
frequency in developing countries. Better reporting cannot satisfactorily explain the 
nonlinear impacts of governance either. Moreover, our regressions include country and 
time fixed effects. A caveat noted explicitly by the DFO is that the quality of the flood-
event information varies from nation to nation: ―[N]ews from floods in low-tech countries 
tend to arrive later and be less detailed than information from ‗first world‘ countries.‖ In 
addition, less democratic countries might systematically underreport the number of 
casualties. Both these effects are captured by the country-specific effects as long as they 
are constant over time. If reporting improves over time, however, country fixed effects will 
not pick up the differences in reporting. Time fixed effects will pick them up as long as 
these improvements are driven by, say, technological change (e.g., improvements in remote 
sensing, which DFO uses extensively) or international initiatives that are common to all the 
countries. 
The result that income and governance matter only when we include high-fatality 
floods parallels a finding that these variables have larger effects on earthquake fatalities 
when the sample is limited to large earthquakes (Keefer et al. 2010). It could be due to the 
aggregate nature of our measures of income and governance, which are measured at the 
national level. Big events that cause many fatalities are more likely to attract the attention 
of national governments than small events, which are more likely to be left to state and 
local governments to manage. If so, then it makes sense that our income and governance 
variables are significant when we include the larger events but not when we exclude them, 
as they do not reflect the differences in income and governance that exist between different 
parts of a country and are important for explaining subnational responses to smaller floods. 29 
 
Identifying the effects of income and governance on smaller flood events might therefore 
require the development of more disaggregated versions of these variables, comparable to 
the event-specific population variable that we used in our flood fatality and magnitude 
models. 
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Table 1: Immediate impacts of disaster (1985-2009), by disaster type  
Panel A  Absolute number  
 
Number of events  People dead 
People affected 
(million) 
Damages 2009  
(mill. US$) 
Floods  2893  175453  2,677  7,723 
Storms  2251  414425  722  24,641 
Extreme temperature  339  101638  92  1,162 
Earthquakes  656  601032  136  6,059 
Droughts  352  7512  1,425  29 
Other  829  47825  16  1,669 
Total  7,320  1,347,885  5,068  41,282 
          Panel B  Percentage of total 
 
Number of events  People dead  People affected   Damages 2009 
Floods  40  13  53  19 
Storms  31  31  14  60 
Extreme temperature  5  8  2  3 
Earthquakes  9  45  3  15 
Droughts  5  1  28  0 
Other  11  4  0  4 
Source: Authors from EMDAT, the OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database (www.emdat.be), 
Universite Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium (Data version: v12.07, 2010).  
To be included in the database, an event needs to fulfill at least one of the following criteria: (i) 10 or more 
people killed, (ii) 100 or more people reported affected (typically displaced); (iii) a declaration of a state of 
emergency; (iv) a call for international assistance.  
The "Other" category includes wildfires, wet and dry mass movements (landslides, avalanches, etc.), and 
volcanoes. People dead include persons confirmed as dead and persons missing and presumed dead. People 
affected are those requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency, i.e. requiring basic survival 
needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and immediate medical assistance. 
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Table 2: Effects of vulnerability indicators on flood mortality 
  Indirect effects 
Through flood occurrence and magnitude 
Direct effects 
Conditional on flood occurrence and magnitude 
Preemptive  Zoning regulations 
Infrastructure (e.g. dams) 
Zoning/building regulations 
Monitoring and information systems 
Reactive   Infrastructure (e.g. dam release) 




Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Flood events between 1985 and 2008 (N=2,194) 
  Number of deaths  119  2961  0  138,000 
  Flood magnitude  5.17  1.10  1.30  8.37 
  Pop. Density flooded area  394.46  1275.04  0.02  30,823 
  Country-year statistics (n=108 countries) 
  GDP per capita (PPP 2005$)  9,375  10,190  203  47,996 
  Governance index  6.31  1.69  1.29  9.70 
  Corruption  4.90  2.13  0  10 
  Ethnic tensions  6.34  2.36  0  10 
  Democratic accountability  6.64  2.73  0  10 
  Gini coefficient  45.32  9.44  24.85  62.99 
  Precipitation (mm.)  1,172  765  89  2,702 
  Total area (square km)  1.89E+06  3.18E+06  1.04E+03  1.64E+07 
  Urban population (%)  53.07  22.74  9.16  100 
  Latitude (absolute value)  24.25  15.68  0.42  67.47 
  Elevation (meters)  649  423  18  1,871 
  Coastal land (% total area)  0.37  0.34  0  1 
  Forest area (% total area)  0.30  0.19  0.0000646  0.95 
  Count of floods    1.12      2.55            0           32 
Data Sources: DFO for flood related data (deaths, magnitude, flooded area); Gridded Population of the World 
v3 (CIESIN/CIAT 2005) for population in flooded areas; WDI (2010) for GDP per capita; PRS (2010) for 
Governance indicators.  Gallup et al. (1999) for physical characteristics. Flood magnitude = log(affected 
area*flood duration * flood severity). See text for detailed description of variables. 37 
 
Table 4: Decomposition of coefficient of variation of key explanatory variables 
   
All sample  Developing countries  Developed countries 
Variable  Overall  Between   Within  Overall  Between   Within  Overall  Between   Within 
ln(GDP pc PPP)  0.243  0.163  0.185  0.203  0.139  0.161  0.331  0.247  0.260 
Governance  0.267  0.219  0.112  0.212  0.179  0.141  0.096  0.126  0.046 
ln(Population)  0.213  0.133  0.191  0.211  0.121  0.190  0.216  0.149  0.191 
Urban population (%)  0.430  0.422  0.070  0.438  0.451  0.093  0.118  0.230  0.025 
Forest area (%)  0.582  0.664  0.088  0.626  0.714  0.103  0.448  0.524  0.028 
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Table 5. Results for equation (1), flood frequency. Dependent variable: no. floods per country-year; ln(no. floods+1) in linear FE 
model. Time-invariant controls in the regular Poisson model are ln(national area), mean national elevation and latitude, national 


















             
ln(GDP pc PPP)  0.0110  -0.775*  -0.518***  -0.726***  2.101**  0.103 
  (0.0649)  (0.422)  (0.180)  (0.220)  (0.855)  (0.278) 
ln(GDP pc PPP)
2    0.0544**         
    (0.0256)         
Governance  -0.0259  -0.304**  -0.460**  -0.530*  0.0324  -0.0389 
  (0.0166)  (0.123)  (0.216)  (0.288)  (0.129)  (0.0583) 
Governance
2    0.0224**  0.0376**  0.0430*     
    (0.0113)  (0.0183)  (0.0258)     
ln(National population)  0.112  0.566***  0.603  -0.0882  6.583***  1.327 
  (0.229)  (0.0340)  (0.751)  (0.839)  (1.704)  (1.214) 
Urban pop. (%)  0.00789  -0.00770***  0.0217  0.0383***  -0.213***  0.00112 
  (0.00679)  (0.00257)  (0.0154)  (0.0142)  (0.0655)  (0.0211) 
Forest area (%)  0.0822  -1.847***  0.157  0.790  0.456  -0.268 
  (0.733)  (0.227)  (1.735)  (1.759)  (4.324)  (2.094) 
Gini coefficient            -0.00834 
            (0.0160) 
             
Time-invariant controls  No  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Country FE  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Turning point: Y  -  $1,240  -  -  -  - 
Turning point: G  -  6.8  6.1  6.2  -  - 
             
Observations  2,292  2,244  2,292  1,681  611  637 
Countries  107    107  79  28  76 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.139 
 
Table 6. Results for equation (2), flood fatalities. Dependent variable: number of deaths per flood event in Poisson and FE poisson 
























               
ln(GDP pc PPP)  -0.467**  -0.716***  -1.317  -1.376  -71.32***  -0.0716  -1.862* 
  (0.229)  (0.241)  (0.928)  (1.051)  (15.51)  (0.264)  (1.000) 
ln(GDP pc PPP)
2          3.582***     
          (0.804)     
Governance  -0.0405  -1.576**  -2.792***  -2.970***  0.291  -0.0546  0.0890 
  (0.0572)  (0.615)  (0.484)  (0.496)  (0.375)  (0.0641)  (0.155) 
Governance
2    0.148**  0.260***  0.279***       
    (0.0627)  (0.0582)  (0.0599)       
ln(Affected population)  0.0622**  -0.254  -0.265  -0.297  0.0489*  0.0557**  0.0995 
  (0.0240)  (0.252)  (0.332)  (0.358)  (0.0287)  (0.0239)  (0.0925) 
Urban pop. (%)  0.00107  -0.00892  -0.0494  -0.0505  0.107  0.000118  0.0293 
  (0.0174)  (0.00921)  (0.0433)  (0.0460)  (0.135)  (0.0273)  (0.0656) 
Forest area (%)  -0.128  -0.609  1.441  2.042  -4.595  -0.150  -1.220 
  (1.483)  (1.351)  (6.661)  (7.267)  (10.77)  (1.579)  (6.123) 
Gini coefficient              0.0704** 
              (0.0310) 
               
Time-invariant controls  No  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
Country FE  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
               
Turning point: Y  -  -  -  -  $21,064  -  - 
Turning point: G  -  5.3  5.4  5.3  -  -  - 
               
Observations  2,188  1,934  2,172  1,626  546  2,061  969 
Countries  108    92  72  20  92  61 
               Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 40 
 























               
Magnitude  0.468***  0.660***  0.734***  0.749***  0.716***  0.447***  0.586*** 
  (0.0463)  (0.161)  (0.162)  (0.176)  (0.0867)  (0.0299)  (0.127) 
ln(GDP pc PPP)  1.763*  -1.463**  -1.241**  -1.229*  -44.64***  2.629*  -1.606** 
  (0.926)  (0.598)  (0.573)  (0.639)  (13.51)  (1.490)  (0.658) 
ln(GDP pc PPP)
2  -0.140**        2.249***  -0.173*   
  (0.0630)        (0.686)  (0.0982)   
Governance  -0.0393  -2.392***  -2.977***  -3.167***  0.160  -0.0615  0.111 
  (0.0474)  (0.920)  (0.503)  (0.504)  (0.403)  (0.0531)  (0.113) 
Governance
2    0.222**  0.276***  0.296***       
    (0.0869)  (0.0596)  (0.0607)       
ln(Affected 
population) 
0.126***  -0.0513  -0.235  -0.267  0.155***  0.134***  0.227 
  (0.0221)  (0.244)  (0.412)  (0.442)  (0.0526)  (0.0257)  (0.153) 
Gini coefficient              0.0516* 
              (0.0310) 
               
Time-invariant 
controls 
No  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
Country FE  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
               
Turning point: Y  $543  -  -  -  $20,423  $1,995  - 
Turning point: G  -  5.4  5.4  5.3  -  -  - 
               
Observations  2,194  2,194  2,178  1,627  551  2,067  969 
Countries  109  109  93  72  21  93  61 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 41 
 
Table 8. Results for equation (4), flood magnitude. Dependent variable: physical magnitude of a flood event, expressed as 




















             
ln(GDP pc PPP)  -0.115  -2.264**  -0.105  -11.84**  -0.269  -0.351 
  (0.0783)  (1.001)  (0.167)  (5.570)  (0.180)  (0.349) 
ln(GDP pc PPP)
2    0.136**    0.597**     
    (0.0646)    (0.282)     
Governance  0.000327  -0.00219  0.0167  -0.0764  -0.0105  -0.143** 
  (0.0371)  (0.0348)  (0.0302)  (0.131)  (0.0373)  (0.0645) 
ln(Affected population)  -0.151***  -0.138***  -0.168***  -0.0968*  -0.140***  -0.170*** 
  (0.0279)  (0.0302)  (0.0297)  (0.0566)  (0.0304)  (0.0390) 
Urban pop. (%)  -0.00299  -0.0296**  -0.0343***  0.116***  -0.0335**  -0.0442 
  (0.00306)  (0.0127)  (0.0123)  (0.0298)  (0.0128)  (0.0289) 
Forest area (%)  0.252  -0.156  -0.841  2.312  0.390  -1.482 
  (0.253)  (0.988)  (0.989)  (2.526)  (1.005)  (1.871) 
Gini coefficient            0.0296** 
            (0.0139) 
Time-invariant controls  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
Country FE  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Turning point: Y  -  $4,120  -  $20,257  -  - 
             
Observations  1,934  2,188  1,634  554  2,077  984 
Countries    108  80  28  108  76 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Incidence of natural disasters 1985-2009 
 Source: Authors from EMDAT, the OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database (www.emdat.be), 
Universite Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium (Data version: v12.07, 2010). The "Other" category 
includes wildfires, wet and dry mass movements (landslides, avalanches, etc.), and volcanoes. 
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Appendix  
Table A1: Governance Indicators 
Panel A  Definitions of governance indicators 
 
Indicator  Excerpt from variable descriptions in ICRG at www.prsgroup.com 
Corruption  "distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency 
of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of 
power through patronage rather than ability; and, [...], introduces an 
inherent instability into the political process."   
Bureaucratic Quality  "the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic 
changes in policy or interruptions in government services" 
Law and Order  "assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system" and  "of 




"the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, 
or language divisions" 
―the risk involved in these situations range from inexperienced people 
imposing inappropriate policies through civil dissent to civil war‖  
Government Stability  "government‘s ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability 
to stay in office" 
Democratic 
Accountability 
"how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less 
responsive it is, the more likely it is that the government will fall, 
peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-
democratic one" 
 















Corruption  1  0.6738  0.6025  0.3958  0.4899  0.0406  0.5520 
Bureaucratic Quality  1  0.6495  0.3895  0.3111  0.2626  0.5961 
Law and Order 
 
1  0.5500  0.4617  0.4434  0.3250 
Ethnic tensions 
   
1  0.5477  0.3453  0.1071 
Religious tensions 
     
1  0.2057  0.1730 
Government Stability 
   
  1  -0.0302 
Democratic Accountability 




Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) at www.prsgroup.com  
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Table A2: Precipitation regression 
  (1) 
VARIABLES  rainmm 
   
Ln(area)  -56.86** 
  (22.94) 
Forest (%)  988.9*** 
  (179.9) 
Elevation  0.0286 
  (0.0587) 
Latitude  -20.47*** 
  (3.760) 
Coastal (%)  525.8*** 
  (155.8) 
   
Continent dummies  Yes 
   
Observations  140 
R-squared  0.730 
Sample is140 countries for year 2008  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3: Individual governance indicators: results for equation (1), flood frequency, and equation (4), flood magnitude 
  Eq (1): Flood frequency 
FE Poison: quadratic G 
Eq (3): Flood magnitude  
Linear FE: quadratic Y 
VARIABLES  Governance  Corruption  Ethnic tensions  Democratic 
accountability 
Governance  Corruption  Ethnic tensions  Democratic 
accountability 
                 
Ln(GDP pc PPP)  -0.518***  -0.519***  -0.469**  -0.585***  -2.264**  -2.260**  -2.333**  -2.305** 
  (0.180)  (0.198)  (0.195)  (0.215)  (1.001)  (1.054)  (1.082)  (1.024) 
Ln(GDP pc PPP)
2          0.136**  0.136**  0.140**  0.138** 
          (0.0646)  (0.0674)  (0.0691)  (0.0655) 
Governance  -0.460**        -0.00219       
  (0.216)        (0.0348)       
Governance
2  0.0376**               
  (0.0183)               
Corruption    0.0207        0.00711     
    (0.107)        (0.0157)     
Corruption
2    -0.00563             
    (0.00950)             
Ethnic       -0.0242        0.00773   
      (0.0752)        (0.0210)   
Ethnic
2      -0.00212           
      (0.00672)           
Accountability        -0.0456        -0.0123 
        (0.0730)        (0.0186) 
Accountability
2        0.00198         
        (0.00568)         
Ln(population)  0.603  0.599  0.668  0.462  -0.138***  -0.139***  -0.138***  -0.138*** 
  (0.751)  (0.826)  (0.777)  (0.809)  (0.0302)  (0.0301)  (0.0301)  (0.0302) 
Urban pop. (%)  0.0217  0.0199  0.0245  0.0183  -0.0296**  -0.0295**  -0.0298**  -0.0315** 
  (0.0154)  (0.0165)  (0.0154)  (0.0173)  (0.0127)  (0.0126)  (0.0125)  (0.0137) 
Forest area (%)  0.157  0.530  0.809  0.336  -0.156  -0.0679  -0.120  -0.425 
  (1.735)  (1.724)  (1.549)  (1.685)  (0.988)  (1.005)  (0.991)  (1.075) 
                 
Turning point: Y  -  -  -  -  $4,120  $4,060  $4,155  $4,236 
Turning point: G  6.1  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
                 
Observations  2292  2292  2292  2292  2188  2188  2188  2188 
Countries  107  107  107  107  108  108  108  108 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Individual governance indicators: results for equation (2), flood fatalities, and equation (3), flood fatalities 
conditional on magnitude 
  Eq (2): Flood fatalities 
FE Poisson: quadratic G 
Eq (3): Flood fatalities conditional on 
magnitude 
FE Poisson: quadratic G 
VARIABLES  Governance  Corruption  Ethnic tensions  Democratic 
accountability 
Governance  Corruption  Ethnic tensions  Democratic 
accountability 
                 
Magnitude          0.734***  0.677***  0.759***  0.709*** 
          (0.162)  (0.179)  (0.184)  (0.173) 
Ln(GDP pc PPP)  -1.317  -0.615  0.133  -0.591  -1.241**  -0.411  -0.438  -0.902 
  (0.928)  (0.803)  (0.572)  (0.799)  (0.573)  (0.631)  (0.504)  (0.860) 
Ln(GDP pc PPP)
2                 
                 
Governance  -2.792***        -2.977***       
  (0.484)        (0.503)       
Governance
2  0.260***        0.276***       
  (0.0582)        (0.0596)       
Corruption    -1.096***        -1.087***     
    (0.273)        (0.308)     
Corruption
2    0.125***        0.122***     
    (0.0414)        (0.0463)     
Ethnic       -1.113***        -1.086***   
      (0.340)        (0.387)   
Ethnic
2      0.0686**        0.0607   
      (0.0312)        (0.0377)   
Accountability        -0.567        -0.643 
        (0.393)        (0.414) 
Accountability
2        0.0405        0.0496 
        (0.0300)        (0.0321) 
Ln(population)  -0.265  -0.269  -0.279  -0.268  -0.235  -0.238  -0.242  -0.236 
  (0.332)  (0.344)  (0.335)  (0.330)  (0.412)  (0.429)  (0.404)  (0.407) 
Urban pop. (%)  -0.0494  -0.0549  -0.139  -0.0984*         
  (0.0433)  (0.0537)  (0.0911)  (0.0535)         
Forest area (%)  1.441  0.446  -5.233  -4.260         
  (6.661)  (6.527)  (5.071)  (5.467)         
                 
Turning point   5.4  4.4  8.1  -  5.4  4.5  -  - 
                 
Observations  2172  2172  2172  2172  2178  2178  2178  2178 
Countries  92  92  92  92  93  93  93  93 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<47 
 
 